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Communications: Current State of, and
Suggestions for, Federal and
Missouri Practice
I. INTRODUCTION
In a products liability action the plaintiff's attorney engages an expert
witness to testify at trial on behalf of the attorney's client. The defense
attorney for the product manufacturer also plans to call an expert witness at
trial.
During discovery the plaintiff's attorney suspects that the defense expert's
opinions are wholly the creation of the defense attorney. The plaintiff's
attorney, expecting that the expert's opinions are not her own, attempts
discovery of several letters from the defense attorney to the defense expert.
The defense attorney sincerely believes that the complex nature of the
expert testimony in this case renders interrogatory and oral deposition
testimony insufficient to determine the facts. He wishes to obtain written
reports of the plaintiff's expert without which the defense attorney feels he
will be unable to effectively cross-examine plaintiff's expert witness. As a
result, the defense attorney seeks discovery of the report written by plaintiff's
expert for the plaintiff's attorney.
Two competing interests must be weighed in both of these situations.
The cross-examining attorney requires sufficient information to effectively
cross-examine an expert witness on often complex, technical matters. The
proponent of the expert, on the other hand, possesses a legitimate right to
protect the litigation team's trial strategy from pre-trial disclosure under the
work product rule.
This Comment surveys the current trends in protection and discovery of
attorney work product, both factual and opinion, when the party's attorney or
other representative conveys that information to an expert witness who has
been called or retained by the party to testify at trial. This Comment also
examines the federal and Missouri standards for discovery of testifying expert-
attorney communications. Section II briefly summarizes the history of the
work product doctrine and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), examines
the conflict between Rule 26(b)(3)'s strong protection of core work product
and the more liberal discovery provisions of Rule 26(b)(4)(A), and proposes
that attorney-expert communications deserve a high degree of protection when
they rise to the level of work product. Contrary to the holding of several
courts, however, the degree of protection given to attorney-expert communica-
tions should not rise to the level of absolute immunity. Section III examines
1
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the protection of core work product in Missouri when that work product is
transmitted by an attorney to a testifying expert. This Comment argues that
Missouri should soften the absolute immunity of core work product that is
currently mandated by the Missouri courts. Section IV examines the standard
for discovery of expert to attorney communications at the federal level.
Section V looks at the Missouri provisions for discovery of expert to attorney
communications and advocates that the Missouri practice be altered to reflect
the more liberal federal standards and procedures.
The information that the attorney communicates to the expert generally
falls into one of two "work product"' categories. It may be factual work
product-the relevant factual information possessed by the attorney;2 or core
work product-the "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation."
3
The primary issue centers on protection of core work product. An expert
witness must base her opinion testimony on facts and information gleaned
second-hand; the expert will normally not be a witness to the events at issue.
While core work product deserves strong protection, effective cross-examina-
tion of an expert witness hinges on the cross-examiner's ability to fully
understand the foundation for the expert's conclusions. Most attorneys would
relish the opportunity to examine core work product given to the expert and
the expert's reports and notes. This discovery must, however, be balanced
against the strong protection given core work product.
A. Federal Treatment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) governs the scope of discovery
in civil litigation in the federal courts.4 Generally, any matter relevant to the
pending litigation is discoverable.5 If, however, the materials sought by the
discovering party constitute factual or core work product, Rule 26(b)(3) limits
1. Broadly defined as documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representa-
tive. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2024, at 197 (1970); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
2. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
3. Id.; See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2026.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) states in pertinent part: "Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved
in the pending action, whether it relates io the claim or defense of the party seeking
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the scope of permissible discovery.6 This work product limitation restricts
discovery of factual work product to situations where the "party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials... [and] is unable to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means."7 Even when
discovery of factual work product is allowed, the "court shall protect against
disclosure" of core work product.8
Rule 26(b)(4) specifically pertains to discovery of "facts known and
opinions held by experts."9 Factual work product communicated to the expert
is routinely discoverable as "facts known"'0 to the expert. It is unclear
whether core work product conveyed from the attorney to her testifying expert
is discoverable. Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) allows the discovering party to request
"a summary of the grounds for each [testifying expert's] opinion."" This
summary may include opinion work product communicated to the expert.
Additionally, a court may use its discretion to allow discovery of core work
6. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3) states in pertinent part:
Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision
(b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible
things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or
by or for that other party's representative (including the other party's
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials
by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required
showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney
or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) states in pertinent part:
Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held
by experts, otherwise discoverable under [26(b)(1)] ... and acquired or
developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as
follows:
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to
identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert
witness at trial ... and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to
which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for
each opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by
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product, though this discovery is still subject to the limitations of Rule
26(b)(4)(A)(ii).2 Rule 26(b)(3), however, requires protection of core work
product even when factual work product discovery is allowed.
13
Federal Rule of Evidence 61214 may provide an alternative justification
for discovery of core work product. While not a discovery rule per se,
Federal Rule of Evidence 612 may be utilized during the deposition of an
expert witness. Federal Rule of Evidence 612 allows a party to discover and
examine any writing used by witnesses to refresh their memory.' 5 A party
seeking to discover core work product could therefore assert that Federal Rule
of Evidence 612 allows the party to discover writings reviewed by the
expert.16
Discovery of opinion work product reviewed by the expert might also be
required to further the objectives of Federal Rule of Evidence 705."7 The
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence notes that Federal Rule
of Evidence 705's cross-examination provision is only effective if "the cross-
examiner has the advance notice which is essential for effective cross-
12. Id.
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
14. FED. R. Evm. 612 states in pertinent part:
if a witness uses a writing to refresh memory for the purpose of testifying,
either-
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary
in the interests of justice, an adverse party is entitled to have the writing
produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness
thereon ....
15. Id.
16. See Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404 (D. Colo. 1983).
17. FED. R. EvD. 705 states in pertinent part:
Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give
reasons therefore without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data,
unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be
required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
[Vol. 57250
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examination." 8 This "advance knowledge" can only mean pre-trial discovery
and might include core work product reviewed by the expert.
The federal standard for discovery of opinion work product communicat-
ed to a testifying expert remains unclear. As evidenced by the array of
material written,' 9 the current law regarding the discovery of attorney to
expert communications is not settled. The aforementioned rules illustrate
competing policies, and it is this conflict that leads to differing results in
factually similar cases.
B. Missouri Treatment
Although similar to the relevant federal rule, Missouri Rule of Civil
Procedure 56.01 contains substantial differences, which have led to different
treatment for both factual and opinion work product protection. Missouri Rule
56.01(b)(3) utilizes wording identical to Rule 26(b)(3)."° As with Rule
18. FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee's note. It is not unfair to require the
cross-examiner to bring out the underlying facts, assuming
that the cross-examiner has the advance knowledge which is essential for
effective cross-examination. ... Rule 26(b)(4) of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, as revised, provides for substantial discovery in this area,
obviating in large measure the obstacles which have been raised in some
instances to discovery of findings, underlying data, and even identity of
experts.
Id.
19. See, e.g., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1984); Boring
v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404 (D. Colo. 1983); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Bryan Lewis, Note, Discovery Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure of Attorney Opinion Work Product Provided to an Expert
Witness, 53 FoRDHAM L. REVIEW 1159 (1985); Carlisle G. Packard, Note, Opinion
Work Product, Expert Witness Discovery, and the Interaction of Rules 26(b)(3) and
26(b)(4): Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 1985 BYU L. REV. 573 (1985);
Katherine A. Staton, Note, Discovery ofAttorney WorkProductReviewed by an Expert
Witness, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 812 (1985).
20. Mo. R. CIv. P. 56.01(b)(3) states in pertinent part:
TrialPreparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4)
of this Rule 56.01, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible
things otherwise discoverable under subdivisions (b)(1) of this Rule 56.01
and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party
or by or for that other party's representative, including his attorney ...
only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need
of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing
has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental
1992]
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26(b)(3), Missouri Rule 56.01(b)(3) allows discovery of factual work product
upon a showing of "substantial need" and "undue hardship."2' Both rules
require the court to protect core work product when allowing factual work
product discovery.22 Unlike the federal standard for discovery of opinion
work product, the Missouri standard is clear. Missouri courts hold opinion
work product immune from discovery under all circumstances.23
Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 56.01(b)(4) 24 serves a purpose
identical to that of Rule 26(b)(4). Both rules seek to facilitate discovery of
the identity of expert witnesses and the facts known by such expert witness-
es.' Missouri Rule 56.01(b)(4), however, fails to provide discovery as
liberal as Rule 26(b)(4). While Rule 26(b)(4) allows for discovery of "a
summary of the grounds for each [testifying expert's] opinion," 26 Missouri
Rule 56.01(b)(4) does not contain similar language.27 Additionally, some
courts hold that the Missouri rule restricts the allowable methods of discovery
by disallowing document production under any circumstances. 28
Both Rule 26(b)(4) and Missouri Rule 56.01(b)(4) allow discovery of
information transmitted from the expert to the attorney.29 The federal rule,
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation.
21. Id. See supra note 6 for the text of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
22. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
23. State ex rel. Missouri Highway and Transp. Comm'n v. Anderson, 735
S.W.2d 350, 356 (Mo. 1987) (en banc); State ex rel. Board of Registration for the
Healing Arts v. Spinden, 798 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State ex rel. Papin
Builders, Inc. v. Litz, 734 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
24. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(4) states in pertinent part:
Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held
by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision
(b)(1) of this Rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or
for trial, may be obtained only as follows:
(a) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to
identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert
witness at trial and to state the general nature of the subject matter on
which the expert is expected to testify.
(b) A party may discover by deposition the facts and opinions to
which the expert is expected to testify ....
25. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(4).
26. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4).
27. See Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(4).
28. See, e.g., State ex rel. Papin v. Anderson, 735 S.W.2d 350, 356 (Mo. 1987)
(en banc).
29. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4); Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(4).
(Vol. 57
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/10
EXPERT OPINION
however, gives the court discretion to require document production.3
Missouri Rule 56.01(b)(4), as interpreted by the Missouri Supreme Court, does
not allow for the production of documents (such as the expert's written report)
under any circumstances.'
II. AITORNEY TO TESTIFYING EXPERT COMMUNICATIONS:
THE FEDERAL STANDARD
A. Rule 26(b)(3): The History of Work Product Protection
Although questions regarding the discovery of materials prepared by a
party's representative have long engendered debate,32 the history of the work
product doctrine begins with the Supreme Court's 1947 decision in Hickman
v. Taylor3 3 In Hickman, the defendant's attorney, anticipating litigation,
interviewed several survivors and other witnesses of a tugboat accident.
Responding to plaintiff's interrogatory, the defendant's attorney refused to
"summarize or set forth" the contents of those statementsM The Court
summarized the pertinent issue as whether interrogatories, depositions, or
document production pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum "may be used to
inquire into materials collected by an adverse party's counsel in the course of
preparation for possible litigation."35 The Court held as a general matter that
"either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession,"36 but the Court specifically denied the requested discovery of
work product.37 The Court determined that protection of "work product of
the lawyer"' furthered the goal of "proper preparation of a client's case. "' 9
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
31. See Anderson, 735 S.W.2d at 356; Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(4).
32. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2021.
33. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
34. Id. at 496-97.
35. Id. at 505.
36. Id. at 507.
37. Id. at 509.
38. Id. at 511.
39. Id. The Court stated that the lawyer should be allowed to
assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the
irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without
undue and needless interference. That is the historical and necessary way
in which lawyers act within the framework of our system of jurisprudence
to promote justice and to protect their clients' interests .... This work is
reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence,
briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and
1992]
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While work product would not be absolutely immune,40 the party seeking
production would shoulder the burden of establishing "adequate reasons to
justify production."4 1
The Court's decision in Hickman served as the basis for the 1970
amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26,42 which recast Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). This rule adopted the Hickman prerequisites
for work product protection: only materials developed "in anticipation of
litigation" are protected.43 Materials prepared "in the normal course of
business" deserve no work product protection,44 apparently because protect-
ing these materials would not further the goal of effective trial preparation.
Rule 26(b)(3), in accord with Hiclnan,45 protects only "documents and
intangible ways .... Were such materials open to opposing counsel on
mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain
unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his
own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop
... [a]nd the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be
poorly served.
Id.
40. Id. at 511-12.
41. Id. at 512. Where interrogatories, document production, and interviews with
the witnesses would reveal the requested information, counsel's desire to have the oral
statements requested in order to "help prepare himself to examine the witnesses and
to make sure that he has overlooked nothing" was, under the circumstances, an
insufficient reason. Id. at 513.
42. See, e.g., FED R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note (citing Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2023.
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511; WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 1, § 2024.
44. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note ("materials
assembled in ordinary course of business, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated
to litigation, or for other non-litigation purposes" are not protected); In re Murphy, 560
F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1977) (work product privilege does apply to documents prepared
in anticipation of prior, terminated litigation); The St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Continental Cameras Co., Inc., No. 85 Civ. 8984, 1986 WL 6497, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
June 5, 1986) (documents prepared by parties' experts during "normal course of
business" are not protected); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2024 (proposes test
"whether ... the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained
because of the prospect of litigation .... [T]here is no work product immunity for
documents prepared in the regular course of business rather than for purposes of
litigation.").
45. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 504 (party "cannot refuse to answer interrogatories on
the ground that the information sought is solely within the knowledge of his
attorney."); WIGr & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2023 ("There is a distinction, noted
in the Hickman case itself, between documents that a party has assembled and the facts
[Vol. 57
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tangible things."'  The Hickman holding only addressed the issue of work
product prepared by party's counsel.4 7 Rule 26(b)(3) protects not only the
attorney's work product, but also that of a party representative, including his
"consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent."4
Following the Hickman guidelines, Rule 26(b)(3) also differentiates
between factual and opinion work product.49 The Rule 26(b)(3) "substantial
need and undue hardship" test spells out the requirements for discovery of
factual work product ° The Hickman standard for discovery of opinion work
product, however, is ambiguous.51 According to Rule 26(b)(3), opinion work
product receives a higher degree of protection than factual work product, but
the rule expresses no exact standard.5 2 Courts disagree on the extent of
opinion work product immunity. Some courts focus on the Hickman Court's
belief that no "showing of necessity can be made under the circumstances of
this case so as to justify production" of the statements memorialized by the
attorney. Courts following this theory would accord opinion work product
a degree of protection akin to absolute immunity.
he has learned from those documents.").
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
47. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
49. Hickman clearly differentiated between discovery of facts ("where relevant
and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of
those facts is essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may be properly
had") and opinion work product (the attorney's thoughts, impressions, strategies and
beliefs, "heretofore inviolate" should be protected from "undue and needless
interference .... "). Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) requires the
discovering party to meet a "substantial need and undue hardship" test for production
of factual work product. The second sentence of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) states that
even when factual discovery is allowed, opinion work product should be protected.
FED R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
50. In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 334 (8th Cir. 1977) (while Hickman did not
clearly state the relevant "quantum of proof," the 1970 amendment to Rule 26(b)(3)
establishes a "qualified immunity" for factual or "ordinary" work product, subject to
the discussed test); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2025.
51. Compare the statement that opinion work product should be protected from
"undue and needless interference" with the Hickman Court's statement that "[a]n
attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own." Hickman, 329 U.S.
at 511 (emphasis added).
52. Unlike the clear standard delineated for factual work product, FED. R CIV. P.
26(b)(3) states only that the court shall protect opinion work product when allowing
discovery of factual work product pursuant to the substantial need and hardship test.
53. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 512; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d
840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973) (opinion work product is absolutely protected).
1992]
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The better interpretation of the protection requirement affords core work
product a high degree of protection, but not absolute immunity. 4 While
later Supreme Court decisions refuse to accord absolute immunity, they clearly
express a continued stand-in favor of strong core work product protection.5
B. The Liberal Discovery Provisions of Rule 26(b)(4)
In 1970, a new section was added to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.5 6  The new section, 26(b)(4), delineated the scope of
discovery of expert witnesses.57 Unlike the amendment to Rule 26(b)(3), this
new section did not codify Hiclanan, but rather responded to "problems
suggested by a relatively recent line of authorities."58 These recent cases
presented complex situations in which expert testimony would "likely be
determinative." 59 The Advisory Committee, realizing that expert testimony
could be determinative even in a situation in which only one expert testified,
declined to draw a "line between complex and simple cases, or between cases
with many experts and those with but one."' 6
The new section allowed the discovering party to obtain three things:
identity of the testifying experts, summary of the anticipated subject matter of
the expert's testimony, and the substance of the facts and opinions upon which
the expert is expected to testify, along with a summary of the grounds for
each opinion.61 Procedurally, Rule 26(b)(4) allows for discovery as a matter
of right only by interrogatory. 62 Further discovery is allowed only upon
motion and court order.63
54. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,401-02 (1981); Bogosian
v. Gulf Oil Co., 738 F.2d 587, 593 (3d Cir. 1984); Murphy, 560 F.2d at 326 (opinion
work product "enjoys nearly absolute immunity and can be discovered only in very
rare and extraordinary circumstances").
55. See, e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401-02.
56. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note ("This is a new provision
dealing with discovery of information (including facts and opinions) obtained by a
party from an expert retained by that party .....
57. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
58. Id. advisory committee's note.
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note (drug, patent, and
condemnation cases were specifically cited as examples). For a general discussion of
the reasons behind the adoption of Rule 26(b)(4), see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
1, § 2029.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note.
61. Id.; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2030.
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
63. Id. The advisory committee's note to subdivision (b)(4) states that it
substantially mirrors the procedure set forth in Knighton v. Villian & Fassio e
256 [Vol. 57
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The fundamental purpose behind Rule 26(b)(4) lies in the need for
counsel to cross-examine expert witnesses effectively." Prohibiting an
attorney's use of Rule 26(b)(4)(A) to acquire relevant information "produces
the very evils that discovery has been created to prevent."" As the Advisory
Committee states, "[e]ffective cross-examination of an expert witness requires
advance preparation. The lawyer, even with the help of his own experts,
frequently cannot anticipate the particular approach his adversary's expert will
take or the data on which he will base his judgment on the stand."6
C. The Conflict Between Rule 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4)(A)
Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) governs discovery of factual data known to a
testifying expert or upon which the testifying expert bases an opinion.'
Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) expressly states that factual information known to the
expert is discoverable by interrogatory. Therefore, the discovering party may
obtain this information as a matter of right. Further, discovery at the
discretion of the court is routinely granted." Because the need and hardship
Compagnia Int'l di Genova Societe Riuniti di Navigazione, 39 F.R.D. 11 (D. Md.
1965). This decision and an earlier draft allowed the discovering party to depose the
expert or utilize any other discovery device appropriate to obtain the facts known and
opinions held by the expert. The adopted version of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i)
restricts such further discovery by allowing it only at the court's discretion. WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 1, § 2031. The rule mandates that a party must first attempt
discovery through interrogatory and that failure to comply will likely result in a denial
of a motion for discovery relating to materials not previously explored by interrogato-
ry. See United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 72 F.R.D. 78, 81
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("insofar as IBM seeks, by documentary production or deposition
question, information encompassed by this Rule [26(b)(4)(A)] without first resorting
to the interrogatories contemplated by subsection (A)(i), defendant's motion must be
denied").
64. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note; Bogosian v.
Gulf Oil Co., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1984); Occulto v. Adamar of N.J., Inc., 125
F.R.D. 611, 615 (D.N.J. 1989) ("[m]eaningful discovery of an expert's opinions is
necessary to foster effective cross-examination .... "); Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D.
404,407-08 (D. Colo. 1983) (26(b)(4) allows discovery of experts "so that a party may
prepare for cross-examination and impeachment of any prospective witness").
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note.
66. Id.
67. See Note, supra note 61, and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 595 (attorney entitled to discover facts
contained in documents containing both fact and opinion after redaction of opinion
work product); Elco Industries, Inc. v. Hogg, No. 86 C 6947, 1989 WL 58203 (N.D.
Ill. May 26, 1988) ("substantially factual" documents given to expert which may
influence testimony must be produced); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Indus.,
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test of Rule 26(b)(3) is expressly made subject to Rule 26(b)(4), 69 most
courts grant further discovery of factual information without requiring the
discovering party to meet the Rule 26(b)(3) burden. 0
1. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil & the Standard for Core Work Product
Protection
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.7' addresses the applicable standard for
discovery of opinion work product communicated from the attorney to
testifying experts. In Bogosian, the documents sought consisted solely of the
attorneys' "mental impressions and thought processes relating to the legal
theories of a complex case."' 2 The district court acknowledged that the
materials sought were core work product,73 but ordered production of the
documents because 26(b)(3), by its own terms, is subject to the provisions of
26(b)(4). 74 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
district court had misread 26(b)(3). A proper reading of 26(b)(3), the panel
stated, led to the realization that the limiting effect of 26(b)(4) only applied
to the first sentence of 26(b)(3).75 While factual work product discovery in
this situation was governed by 26(b)(4),76 Rule 26(b)(4) afforded no
alteration of the strong protection accorded opinion work product by 26(b)(3).77
Inc., 553 F. Supp 45, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Court has "considerable discretion" to order
additional discovery. Court compelled disclosure of workpapers used by experts in
arriving at damages figures.).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
70. See, e.g., Packard, supra note 19, at 574-78; c.f Hamel v. General Motors
Corp., 128 F.R.D. 281, 283 (D. Kan. 1989) (requiring "balancing test" for production
of factual work product. "One must consider whether there has been a showing of
substantial need and undue hardship in obtaining the material or the substantial
equivalent of the materials."). This requirement seems odd in light of the fact that,
assuming that interrogatories failed to produce the information necessary for effective
cross-examination of the witness as to facts known, one faces great difficulty in
obtaining those facts communicated to the expert from any source other than the expert
or the party retaining the expert.
71. 738 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1984).
72. Id. at 593.
73. Id. at 594.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) (factual discovery beyond interrogatory would
be discretionary with the court).
77. Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 594 (quoting Dist. Ct.'s. Tr. at 36) ("proviso does not
limit the second sentence of Rule 26(b)(4) .... Thus it does not support the district
court's conclusion that Rule 26(b)(3)... 'must give way' to Rule 26(b)(4)"),
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Additionally, the district court concluded that a party's entitlement under
26(b)(4) to a summary of the grounds for each expert opinion 78 allowed for
further discovery of opinion work product where "the attorney's thoughts and
opinions given to an expert witness can constitute part of the grounds for the
expert witness' opinion."79 The appellate court rejected this conclusion.'
Noting that Rule 26(b)(4) aims to facilitate effective cross-examination by
allowing discovery of "facts known or opinions held" by the expert,8 the
court held the discovery of core work product unnecessary8 The court
concluded that even when the lawyer's role in expert preparation is in
issue,83 the "marginal value in the revelation on cross-examination that the
expert's view may have originated with an attorney's opinion or theory" fails
to override the immunity of core work product." In dictum, the court stated
that Federal Rule of Evidence 612 provides no firmer foundation upon
which to allow core work product discovery.86
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
79. Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 595 (quoting Dist. Ct.'s. Tr. at 36, 37).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. ("[E]xamination and cross-examination of the expert can be comprehensive
and effective on the relevant issue of the basis for an expert's opinion without an
inquiry into the lawyer's role in assisting with the formulation of the theory.").
83. The court felt that this was not an issue here. Id.
84. Id.
85. See supra note 14 for the text of FED. R. EVID. 612.
86. Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 595 n.3 (assuming FED. R. EvID. 612 did apply "to
documents shown before trial to an outside expert, the purposes of Rule 612 are
generally fully served without disclosure of core work product."). The Bogosian court
also noted that FED. R. EVID. 612, like FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4), cannot override the
opinion work product provision of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Id. Accord North
Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 108 F.R.D. 283,286
(M.D.N.C. 1985) ("absolute privilege" accorded attorney's work product by 26(b)(3)
overrides any Rule 612 request for production of those documents); Carter-Wallace,
Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Indus., Inc., 553 F. Supp. 45, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Rule 612
gives courts discretionary power to order production of documents used to refresh
expert deponents' memory, unless such documents fall within work product
protection). Contra S & A Painting Co., Inc. v. O.W.B. Corp., 103 F.R.D. 407 (W.D.
Pa. 1984) (referral to opinion work product during deposition of non-expert witness
waived work product immunity for those portions of document referred to pursuant to
Rule 612); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 615-17
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Rule 612 provides for liberal discovery of opinion work product
which has "impact" on expert's testimony, effectuating goal of effective expert cross).
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While not explicitly stating a standard for discovery of core work product
communicated to an expert, the Bogosian panel's holding clearly implies that
opinion work product should enjoy virtually absolute protection regardless of
its transmission to a testifying expert.87 The Bogosian panel expresses a
clear willingness to protect core work product at the expense of effective
cross-examination.
Many commentators support the majority holding in Bogosian;8
however, the dissenting opinion of Judge Becker8 9 has also drawn praise. 90
The difference between the majority and the dissent is primarily one of
degree. In dissent, Judge Becker criticizes the majority's standard for
discovery of work product, implying that it appears to afford absolute
immunity in substance, if not in name. 91 The dissent would maintain a high
degree of work product immunity,92 but allow for a balancing test.93 This
balancing approach would weigh the extremely high degree of protection
accorded core work product against the needs of the would be cross-examiner.
Only under exceptional circumstances would the discovery be allowed.
Realizing that the fundamental goal of Rule 26(b)(4)(A) is providing for
effective cross-examination of experts at trial,94 the dissent criticizes the
absolutist approach of the majority.95
87. See Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 595 (examination of lawyer's role in shaping expert
testimony is of marginal value and does not override the need for core work product
protection).
88. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 19 at 1172; Staton, supra note 19, at 821.
89. Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 596 (Becker, J., dissenting).
90. See, e.g., Packard, supra note 19, at 573.
91. Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 596 (Becker, J., dissenting) ("[U]nder the majority's
approach, core work product is subject to an extremely high degree of protection that
can be overcome only by a kind of showing that has yet to be made in any reported
case but that may yet be made on some extraordinary, as yet unforeseeable record.").
92. Id. at 598 ("Were we in an ordinary discovery situation, I might go as far as
the majority does in protecting work product.").
93. Id. ("This balance would test whether the defendants' interest in having this
material available for cross examination. .. 'at trial' outweighs the plaintiffs' interest
in protecting this core work product."). Id. at 597. Judge Becker's dissent may
indicate the relevant standard by stating that opinion work product could, in some
cases, "critically" affect the expert's credibility. Id. at 598.
94. Id. (materials value here for impeachment purposes); accord FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(4) advisory committee's note.
95. Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 598 (Dissent disagrees with majority's characterization
of the materials having a "marginal value." Judge Becker maintains that the revelation
that an expert's theory is not his own may "critically alter the finder of fact's
assessment of the expert's testimony.").
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Judge Becker's dissenting opinion cites Federal Rule of Evidence 7051
as providing additional support for his position.' Unlike lay witnesses,
expert witnesses are allowed by Rule 705 to give opinion testimony without
testifying as to their underlying data.98 The Advisory Committee's note to
Rule 705 supports the dissent's conclusion that the Committee considered
effective discovery of the foundational data for the expert's opinion a
prerequisite to effective application of Rule 705.9 While the dissent does
not radically alter the standard under which core work product would be
discoverable, it avoids the absolute approach implied by the majority holding.
The dissent strikes a better balance between the traditional immunity afforded
opinion work product by Hickaan and the liberal expert discovery and
evidence rules necessitated by the increased reliance on expert testimony.
Procedurally, Judge Becker advocates an in camera inspection of any
contested documents when discovery of expert information is at issue.1°0
If, in the court's opinion, the impeachment value of the document "would
significantly outweigh the chill on development of legitimate attorney work
product that would admittedly accompany disclosure,"' 1 then discovery
should be allowed. 0 2 Because the impeachment value of core work product,
which is the key to effective cross-examination, can only be determined on a
case-by-case basis, the procedural device found in Judge Becker's dissent
offers the best approach.
2. Cases Allowing Liberal Discovery of Core Work Product
Several courts reject the high immunity standard afforded core work
product represented by the Bogosian majority and dissent.'0 3  These
decisions hold that when attorneys communicate core work product to their
testifying expert, the communicating party waives the Rule 26(b)(3) immuni-
ty.10 4
96. See supra note 17 for the text of this rule.
97. Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 598 (Becker, J., dissenting).
98. FED. R. EvID. 705.
99, FED. R. EvID. 705 advisory committee's note.
100. Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 598 (Becker, J., dissenting).
101. Id. The dissent is careful to emphasize that core work product deserves a
high degree of immunity. Id.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D. Colo. 1983); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (dictum).
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Boring v. Keller,'05 a leading waiver case, employed a two-step process
in finding waiver of immunity. 1°6 First, the panel stated that waiver of core
work product protection could occur. 7 The court relied on the decision in
United States v. Nobles,'08 where the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
privilege derived from the work product doctrine is not absolute. Like other
qualified privileges, it can be waived."' 9 Second, the Boring court stated
that the foundational facts and data of a testifying expert's opinion traditional-
ly enjoyed no work product protection. ° The court cited two pre-1970
decisions, United States v. McKay"' and United States v. Meyer"' for the
proposition that "the underlying facts and opinions supporting the [expert's]
opinion have traditionally constituted an exception to the work product
rule."' In contrast to Bogosian, this approach mechanically promotes the
interests of the cross-examiner to the detriment of core work product
protection.
Several courts criticize the Boring holding.1 4 First, the Boring panel's
reliance on Nobles is misplaced." 5 In Nobles, a waiver of work product
protection occurred when an investigator for the producing party (considered
by the Court to be an expert) testified at trial." 6 The Court stated that work
product immunity was waived with respect to matters covered in the
investigator's testimony." 7 While waiver of work product immunity at trial
for matters testified to is not seriously controverted by any court, waiver
during pre-trial discovery represents a much greater intrusion on the attorney-
client relationship.
105. 97 F.R.D. 404.
106. Id. at 407.
107. Id.
108. 422 U.S. 225 (1945).
109. Boring, 97 F.R.D. at 407 (quoting Nobles, 422 U.S. at 239).
110. Id.
111. 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967).
112. 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968).
113. Boring, 97 F.R.D. at 407.
114. See, e.g., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp. 738 F.2d 587,593 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The
district court concluded that showing the material to the witnesses did not waive the
protection for attorney work product, a view we accept as supported by persuasive
authority.").
115. See id. at 593-94 n.1.
116. See Nobles, 422 U.S. at 237.
117. Id. ("Respondent can no more advance the work-product doctrine to sustain
a unilateral testimonial use of work-product materials than he could elect to testify in
his own behalf and thereafter assert his Fifth Amendment privilege to resist cross-
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Boring also incorrectly relies on McKay and Meyer, the two pre-1970
Supreme Court cases. The 1970 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure amendment,
which added Rule 26(b)(4)(A), specifically attempted to address the pre-1970
conflicts as to the discovery standard of expert facts and opinions.118 As
discussed previously,' 9 information communicated to an expert witness is
clearly eligible for work product protection. To the extent that these pre-
amendment cases hold otherwise, Rule 26(b)(4) should prevail.
Several courts utilize a broad interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence
612 as an avenue for discovery of core work product.' 20 The court's
opinion in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.'21 exemplifies the
reasoning process used by courts subscribing to the Federal Rule of Evidence
612 discovery theory." In Berkey, the plaintiff sought production of four
notebooks reviewed by defendant's experts several months before their
depositions. 2  These notebooks contained various core work product
materials124 used by the experts as "background." 25 The court noted that
the present liberal discovery rules designed to favor effective cross-examina-
tion made it "disquieting to posit that a party's lawyer may 'aid' a witness
with ... work product and then prevent totally the access that might reveal
and counteract the effects of such assistance."' 26 The panel stated that the
Hickman Court never faced the issue of work product used to prepare and
"very possibly, to influence and shape testimony, with the anticipation that
these efforts should remain forever unknowable and undiscoverable.'
127
While the Berkey court believed that there was "room for allowing discovery,
either on a theory of waiver or of qualified privilege" the materials previously
produced in the instant case obviated the necessity of producing the requested
materials."
118. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note.
119. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., S & A Painting Co., Inc. v. D.W.B. Corp., 103 F.R.D. 407 (W.D.
Pa. 1984); James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
121. 4 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
122. Id. at 615-17.
123. Id. at 614.
124. Id. at 614 (The notebooks consisted of attorney's "synthesis of the facts and
factual issues" and represented the attorney's "legal analysis, mental impressions ...
legal judgments as to what facts were needed to be understood, mastered, and possibly
presented in the trial of the Berkey case.").
125. Id.
126. Id. at 616.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 617.
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Courts allowing liberal discovery of opinion work product, where that
work product was reviewed by the expert, may fail to adequately differentiate
between material witness and expert witness review of documents prepared by
an attorney. Liberal discovery of documents reviewed by a material witness
makes good sense. If a material witness, testifying to facts observed, must
review or rely on documentary evidence, then the material witness's credibility
becomes a relevant topic for cross-examination. The opposing attorney should
receive full access to those materials reviewed or relied upon to more
effectively examine the witness's credibility. Expert witnesses, on the other
hand, generally always review some form of documentation to obtain the
information necessary to form a valid opinion. To state that the review
necessary to adequately prepare the testifying expert automatically triggers
examination under Rule 612 ignores the fundamental difference between
material witness and expert witness testimony. When a material witness
reviews documents prior to testimony, one may safely presume that the
witness's memory or perception of the events testified to might have been
colored by the documentary review. Therefore, review of those documents by
the opposing party should be allowed. In contrast, however, an expert witness
must generally obtain relevant information from second hand sources rather
than from first-hand observations. To claim that this expert review of
documents automatically triggers the identical concerns as material witness
review requires one to disregard the purpose of Rule 612.
Additionally, courts following the Rule 612 doctrine fail to consider the
necessity for a high degree of opinion work product protection. The Supreme
Court,129 and Rule 26(b)(3), and arguably Rule 26(b)(4), express the
importance of maintaining a high degree of core work product protection in
all circumstances. To hold that the communication of information from the
attorney to the testifying expert automatically allows opposing counsel to
obtain the documents disregards the important concerns 13 underlying the
opinion work product rule.
In a situation where the written communication of core work product has
actually been referred to by the expert during his deposition, courts following
the Rule 612 approach have held that only those portions of the writing
actually utilized by the expert are subject to discovery. The document
should be produced for an in camera inspection, with disclosure of only those
portions of the document actually used to refresh memory. This approach
129. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
130. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
131. S & A Painting Co., Inc. v. D.W.B. Corp., 103 F.R.D. 404, 410 (W.D. Pa.
1984).
132. Id.. Courts favoring high immunity for core work product criticize the liberal
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offers a reasonable compromise between the competing policies of effective
cross-examination and strong work-product protection.
The best solution is to continue the high degree of opinion work product
immunity favored by the Bogosian dissent. An expert's review of, and
reliance on, a particular document should be a relevant circumstance
considered during an in camera review of the document. Where effective
cross-examination can occur from non-opinion portions of the document, the
tradition of high immunity for core work product should prevail. The
protection of core work product should give way to the needs of the cross-
examiner only under exceptional circumstances.
III. DISCOVERY OF WORK PRODUCT COMMUNICATED TO AN EXPERT
EXPECTED TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL: THE MISSOURI STANDARD
While some controversy exists at the federal level concerning the
standard for core work product immunity,133 the Missouri standard is clear.
Opinion work product in Missouri is immune from discovery.'3
Missouri courts clearly state that an attorney's core work product is
immune from discovery. Prior to the adoption of the current version of
Missouri Rule 56.01, all attorney work product was undiscoverable. 35
Subsequent to the revision of Rule 56.01, several Missouri cases indicate that
core work product remains inviolate.
In Papin Builders, Inc. v. Lit2,13 6 the panel stated that "[a]n attorney's
'work product' of mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories
is immune from discovery." 3 7 Similarly, in State ex rel Missouri Highway
& Transportation Commission v. Anderson,138 the Missouri Supreme Court,
in dicta, stated that Rule 56.01(b)(3) protects core work product and that this
use of FED. R. EVID. 612 to afford discovery of core work product. See, e.g., Schlitz
Brewing Co. v. Muller & Phipps (Hawaii) Ltd., 85 F.R.D. 118 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
133. See supra section II.C. of this Comment.
134. See, e.g., State ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n v. Anderson
735 S.W.2d 350, 356 (Mo. 1987) (en banc); State ex rel. Board for the Healing Arts
v. Spinden, 798 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (Opinion work product absolutely
immune); Papin Builders, Inc. v. Litz, 734 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (An
attorney's 'work product' of mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories is immune from discovery).
135. See, e.g., State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Dalton, 498 S.W.2d 801
(Mo. 1973) (en bane); State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Jensen, 362 S.W.2d
568 (Mo. 1962) (en banc).
136. 734 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)..
137. Id. at 857 (citing Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01).
138. 735 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) [hereinafter Anderson 1].
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protection "is afforded even if the [party] made the 'required showing' of
'substantial need' and 'hardship,' ... ,
This approach, similar to the holding of the Bogosian majority, fails to
allow any consideration of the needs of the cross-examiner. As discussed
previously, discovery must furnish sufficient information for effective cross-
examination of the expert witness. The Missouri approach does not allow for
those exceptional circumstances where core work product communicated to
the expert is vital to effective cross-examination.
Because the United States Supreme Court has declined to give core work
product absolute immunity, the Missouri standard is simply too high. Core
work product certainly deserves a high degree of protection,14° but as
previously discussed, 4' situations may arise where the need to ensure
attorneys a "zone of privacy" in which to prepare their cases are outweighed
by a competing need to produce the opinion work product.14 Missouri
courts should protect core work product, but deny it an absolute immunity.
IV. DISCOVERY OF EXPERT OPINIONS AND REPORTS TRANSMITTED
TO ATTORNEY: THE FEDERAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) provides not only the means for
production of attorney-expert communications, but also for production of
expert opinions and reports transmitted to the attorney.14 Although some
early opinions held that an expert's opinions and reports were privileged work
product,' 44 this view has been repudiated by the federal rules of civil
procedure advisory committee. 41 The current practice allows for initial
interrogatories' 46 and further discovery at the discretion of the court. 147
The federal approach for discovery of expert opinions demonstrates a
realistic view of the increasing importance of expert testimony in litigation.
While an expert is part of a party's litigation "team," the expert, unlike the
party's attorney, will testify at trial. Effective cross-examination may often
require more background information than can be obtained by interrogatory
139. Id. at 356. See supra notes 68-99 and accompanying text.
140. See supra sections H.B. and II.C. of this Comment.
141. See supra notes 71-102 and accompanying text.
142. Id.
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
144. See United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v.
McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967).
145. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note (rejecting as ill-
considered those decisions that protect expert opinion as work-product).
146. FFD. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
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and oral deposition testimony. The federal standard provides for additional
discovery where needed.
In Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Division, United Aircraft Corp., for
example, the court allowed discovery of the reports of a testifying expert. The
court noted that, although deposition is the normal discretionary method for
discovery,, no reason existed to forbid production of the document itself.'49
The court stated that "[d]iscovery of the reports of experts, including reports
embodying preliminary conclusions, can guard against the possibility of a
sanitized presentation at trial, purged of less favorable opinions expressed at
an earlier date. ' 15o
At least one court has placed some restrictions on the discretionary
discovery allowed by Rule 26(b)(4). In Baise v. Alewel's, Inc.,5'5 the court
denied discovery of the expert's report, stating that the discovering party had
not established any "genuine need" for the document. 152 The court felt that
the party's desire for "searching cross-examination" could be satisfied by
allowing discovery of the factual and scholarly basis for the expert's opinions,
as well as other, unspecified discovery.' 53 The court additionally stated that
a principle of mutuality might come into play if discovery were allowed. The
court believed that the discovering party, to discover the report of the
opponent's expert, may be required to reciprocate by giving the opponent
similar discovery of their expert.54 This reciprocity requires an attorney to
consider whether the benefit gained from obtaining the other side's expert
report is worth the cost of disclosing the reports of the attorney's own experts.
Although courts possess some discretion as to discovery of expert reports,
Rule 26(b)(4) does not extend "work product" type protection to expert created
materials. Expert communications tfiat contain the expert's opinions or
grounds for opinions are discoverable at the court's discretion under Rule
26(b)(4).
V. DISCOVERY OF EXPERT-AFIORNEY COMMUNICATIONS: THE
MISSOURI STANDARD
Similar to Federal Rule 26(b)(4), Missouri Rule 56.01(b)(4) allows
discovery of both attorney-expert communications and expert opinions and
148. 74 F.R.D. 594 (D. Conn. 1977).
149. Id. at 595.
150. Id.
151. 99 F.R.D. 95 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
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reports.155  Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 56.01(3)156 and (4)1 is
patterned after the matching Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26." While the
(b)(3) provisions of the Federal and Missouri rules are identical with respect
to the pertinent language,15 9 Missouri Rule 56.01(b)(4) is not identical to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)". and lacks some of the language
that has troubled federal courts in the communicated core work product
situation. The federal rule, which entitles the discovering party to a
"summary" of the grounds for each expert opinion, potentially allows for
broader discovery than the Missouri rule, which provides discovery only of
facts known by the testifying expert.' 6' Missouri restricts discovery of
opinion work product by omitting the Federal Rules "summary" require-
ment.' 62 Additionally, the Missouri rule expressly limits discovery of the
expert witness to interrogatories' 63 and depositions.'14  The Missouri
Supreme Court held in State ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transportation
Commission v. Anderson'6 5 that Rule 56.01(b)(3) is inapplicable to discovery
of experts and that Rule 56.01(b)(4) does not authorize the use of a subpoena
duces tecum in expert discovery. The holding in Anderson implies that
155. See Mo. R. CIv. P. 56.01(b)(4).
156. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3). See supra note 20 for the text of this rule.
157. Mo. R. CIV. P. 56.01(b)(4). See supra note 24 for the text of this rule.
158. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01 Committee Note-1974 states: "Paragraph (b)(3) is the
same as Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with the following
deleted . . . " (deletion of material not relevant to the present discussion). The
committee note further states "[t]he source of paragraph (b)(4) is Rule 26(b)(4) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
159. Compare text of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), supra note 6, with text of Mo. R.
CIv. P. 56.01(b)(3), supra note 20.
160. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4), supra note 9, with Mo. R. Civ. P.
56.01(b)(4), supra note 24.
161. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
162. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(3).
163. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(4)(a).
164. Mo. R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(4)(b).
165. 735 S.W.2d 350, 356 (Mo. 1987) (en banc); accord State ex rel. Missouri
Highway and Transp. Comm'n. v. Anderson, 759 S.W.2d 102, 107-08 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988) (Flanigan, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Anderson II] ("I construe the quoted
language from Anderson [735 S.W.2d 350] to preclude the discovery of... [a work
product] written report at the taking of the deposition of [an expert] appraiser. .. ").
Contra Anderson II, 759 S.W.2d at 105-06 (discovery of "comparable sales reports,"
factual in nature, allowed by subpoena duces tecum concurrent to deposition of expert);
State ex rel. Seitrich v. Franklin, 761 S.W.2d 756 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (factual survey
prepared by party's agent and to be used as aid to expert's testimony at trial
discoverable by subpoena duces tecum).
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discovery by "deposition" allows for the issuance of a subpoena to the expert,
but does not allow the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. Because Rule
56.01(b)(4) is silent on this issue, the court's rationale must be based on
precedent that pre-dates the discovery rules' revision.'6 The court's
reliance on these older decisions mirrors several federal court decisions
holding that the expert's work product is somehow protected. 67 Realizing
that effective cross-examination of experts is increasingly important, modem
federal practice rejects the theory that expert "work product" should be
protected as strongly as attorney work product.
A majority of Missouri courts have strictly upheld the limitations on
discovery engendered by this difference between expert and attorney work
product.' The Court of Appeals for the Southern District of Missouri,
however, narrowed the scope of the protection afforded expert materials.
69
In State ex rel. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission v. Ander-
son, 7 0 the Southern District addressed the issue of whether Rule 56.01(b)(4)
protected all materials utilized or prepared by an expert. In Anderson II, the
plaintiff did not seek any materials prepared by the expert, but rather the
comparable sales reports upon which the expert relied in drawing his
conclusions. 7' The court noted that these reports were comparable to "X-
rays supplied to a physician or metal samples gathered by a metallurgist.'7
Noting that "the purpose of the deposition is to discover and test the
opinion of the expert,"'73 the court held the sales reports to be discoverable
by subpoena duces tecum. The Anderson II panel clearly views the "deposi-
tion" language of Rule 56.01(b)(4) differently than does the court in Anderson
I. Anderson II implies that the "deposition may be had by way of subpoena
duces tecum."' 74 The Anderson II court stated that discovery was mandated
by concerns that the withholding of relevant material would "defeat" the
purpose of the expert deposition by not allowing full disclosure and testing of
166. Anderson, 735 S.W.2d at 356-57.
167. See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Anderson I, 735 S.W.2d at 356 ("[lf the matter sought to be
discovered constitutes 'facts known and opinions held by experts,' Rule 56.01(b)(3)
does not come into play at all and the exclusive methods of discovery of that matter
are set forth in and limited by rule 56.01(b)(4). Those methods are interrogatories and
depositions. They do not include the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum in connection
with a hearing.").
169. Anderson II, 759 S.W.2d at 105-06.
170. 759 S.W.2d 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
171. Id. at 105-06.
172. Id. at 106.
173. Id. at 106 (citing United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 71 (9th Cir. 1968)).
174. Id. at 105-06.
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the expert's conclusions. 175 While the court, in dictum, seemed to imply
that the expert's reports were also discoverable, this result clearly contradicts
the Missouri Supreme Court's holding in Anderson L
While in Anderson HI the Southern District implied that expert reports
were discoverable, the court clearly challenged the holding of Anderson I in
State ex rel. Seitrich v. Franklin.76 In Sietrich, the plaintiffs sought by
subpoena duces tecum to obtain "survey plats, survey notes, field reports and
affidavits" in possession of the defendant's expert.'" Included within the
requested material was matter clearly prepared by the expert. The panel held
that the defendant must produce all of the requested material. 8 While the
panel acknowledged the existence of Anderson I and cited that case for a
collateral proposition, the Sietrich opinion ignored the holding of the Anderson
I court.
The Sietrich panel's holding, although clearly inconsistent with Anderson
I, is compelling. As the Sietrich opinion states,
[t]o say that the attorney for [plaintiff] on deposition, under the authority
of Rule 56.01(b)(4)(b), could question expert witness Krehbiel concerning
the facts and opinions to which he was expected to testify, but that he could
not as an adjunct to such questioning, through the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum as authorized by Rule 57.09(b), have access to material
relevant to the issue in the possession of the expert in order that the
attorney could intelligently cross-examine the expert concerning what facts
he used to formulate his opinion, is contrary to common sense. 79
The Seitrich panel clearly acknowledged Rule 56.01(b)(4), the same rule
that the Missouri Supreme Court held forbade the use of an expert subpoena
duces tecum. While the Supreme Court must have reasoned that the word
"deposition" contained in Rule 56.01(b)(4) limited the available discovery, the
Sietrich court held that "deposition" includes not only a deposition pursuant
to a subpoena, but also pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum.
As discussed earlier, effective cross-examination of expert witnesses is
a difficult task under the best of circumstances. Little effective policy is
accomplished by hiding expert opinions from scrutiny. While the Sietrich
holding clearly contradicts the Missouri Supreme Court's holding inAnderson
I, the Sietrich panel realizes the importance of effective expert cross-
examination.
175. Id. at 106.
176. 761 S.W.2d 756 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
177. Id. at 757.
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Missouri should amend Rule 56.01(b)(4) to allow a "summary of
grounds"'8° inquiry to allow for further discovery at the court's discre-
tion."' The increased use of experts.requires Missouri to bring modem
discovery practices in line with federal practice. Effective cross-examination
of experts requires adequate access to the information upon which the experts'
opinions are based. Missouri's refusal to allow access to the expert's
"summary of grounds" and its refusal to allow further discretionary discovery
hinder the efficient operation of a modern civil litigation system in which
expert witness testimony plays an ever-increasing role. The Missouri Supreme
Court holding inAnderson I clarifies the Missouri procedure for discovery of
expert opinions.183 Discovery is available as a matter of right through
interrogatories and as a discretionary matter through deposition of the expert.
According to Anderson I, production of the expert's report is not authorized
by the Missouri rule.'4
VI. CONCLUSION
Hickman v. Taylor and later Supreme Court cases clearly established a
high standard for production of factual work product and a higher standard for
discovery of core work product. Because the trend towards extensive use of
testifying experts necessitates liberal discovery of the basis for their opinions,
the discovery needed for effective cross-examination should, in the vast
majority of cases, not necessitate invasion of the high privilege accorded work
product. Instances will exist where the impeachment value of core work
product that is shown to an expert will so substantially outweigh the
protection of core work product that discovery should be allowed. Hence,
Judge Becker's dissent in Bogosian seems to strike the proper balance between
Hickman and Rules 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4).
Although core work product in Missouri is immune to discovery,
Missouri should adopt a similar standard to that advocated in the federal
courts. Arguments in favor of an absolute protection of core work product are
no more persuasive at the state level than they are in the federal system.
Where the federal and state rules recognize the necessity of effective expert
discovery, a balancing of cross-examination needs with the high immunity
accorded core work product should exist.
180. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
181. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
182. See supra note 98.
183. See Anderson I, 735 S.W.2d at 356.
184. See id.; accord State ex rel. Highway & Transp. Comm'n v. Pully, 737
S.W.2d 241, 243-44 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
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The federal procedures for discovery of expert opinions and reports are
well settled. The federal standard furthers the important policy of facilitating
effective cross-examination. While the federal rule allowing production of the
expert's report furthers the goals of effective discovery, the arbitrary Missouri
rule forbidding document production does not. As demonstrated by the
Southern District of Missouri, total prohibition on documentary discovery of
experts is contrary to both the needs of the modern litigator and common
sense. Missouri should amend its rule to reflect the federal procedure.
DAN NELSON
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